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DOMESTIC RELATIONS-I954 TENNESSEE SURVEY
WILLIAM J. HARBISON*
ADOPTION OF CHILDREN
An important case dealing with testamentary restraint upon adop-
tions was decided by the Tennessee Supreme Court during the survey
period.' The case was one of first impression in this jurisdiction and
appears to be one of the few decisions upon the subject in the United
States.
In his will testator created a trust for his granddaughter, the child
of his deceased son. He imposed a condition that if the child were
adopted before her eighteenth birthday by someone outside testator's
immediate family, and if her name were changed, then the trust
should terminate and the corpus be distributed to other persons.
After testator's death the condition was breached; the mother of the
child remarried, the child was adopted by 'her stepfather, and her
name was changed, before her eighteenth birthday.
The trustee brought suit in the nature of interpleader to determine
the effect of this breach. The guardian of the child contended that the
condition imposed on the trust was contrary to public policy as being
an unlawful restraint upon adoption, and was merely an in terroren
provision.
2
Both the chancellor and the Supreme Court upheld the condition
and held that its violation forfeited the child's interests. Since the
property belonged to testator, he could impose such conditions and
restraints upon its devolution as he saw fit, within the limits of
statutes and positive rules of law. The court indicated that a prohibi-
tion against adoption "so arbitrary and absolute" as to make the child
a probable public charge might well violate public policy. The present
restraint was partial only, however, and violated no general statutory
provision or rule of policy. Consequently the breach of the condition
forfeited the estate, whether the condition was a condition precedent
or condition subsequent.3
* Lecturer in Law, Vanderbilt University; former Editor-in-Chief, Vander-
bilt Law Review; associate, Trabue and Sturdivant, Nashville, Tennessee.
1. National Bank of Commerce v. Greenberg, 195 Tenn. 217, 258 S.W.2d 765
(1953).
2. The guardian also insisted that the violation occurred during the minority
of the child, while it was incapable of consenting, so that its interests should
not be prejudiced. The court gave the obvious answer, however, that the
testator had fixed the child's eighteenth birthday as the critical point; the
breach would have occurred before that date if at all. Clearly the testator
did not consider the child's consent material. The court stated that the
guardian might be subject to criticism for not having the validity of the
condition determined before permitting it to be breached.
3. The court did not discuss the contention that the restraint was a mere
in terrorem provision. The in terrorem doctrine generally applies to restraints
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The decision seems to be sound and is in accord with the general
rules on the similar subject of restraints upon marriage.4 Absolute
prohibitions against marriage are usually deemed contrary to public
policy,5 but partial restraints have generally been upheld when the
conditions imposed are reasonable in view of all of the circumstances.0
If a restraint upon marriage, whether general or partial, is held
invalid, however, it then becomes important to classify the condition
as precedent or subsequent, since by somewhat arbitrary rules, if not
by historical accident, different consequences flow from this determina-
tion.1 When the restraint is upheld, it will be enforced, regardless of
its classification as a condition precedent or subsequent.8
The only other decision dealing with adoptions during the survey
period was one in which a welfare worker was held in contempt of
court for unjustified interference with a pending adoption. The only
issue was whether the decree of the chancellor was supported by the
preponderance of the evidence. The Court of Appeals had held that it
was not, but the Supreme Court reversed. Only two witnesses had
testified as to the conduct of the welfare worker, these being the
worker herself, who denied any interference, and the natural mother
of the child. The child had been surrendered by the mother before the
chancellor without placing it with the Welfare Department. The
mother alleged that the worker had called her and told her that this
was. a violation of the adoption law, and demanded that the mother
regain custody of the child. The chancellor believed the mother's
on marriage or to prohibitions against contesting wills. Provisions of this
nature may be stricken when the court can find no reason for their insertion
other than to intimidate a legatee. In cases involving restraints on marriage,
however, where the gift is one of personalty and there is a gift over upon
violation of the condition, the in terrorem doctrine is almost universally held
to be inapplicable. Since this case involved a gift over, the doctrine would
not apply to it. See generally HARPER, PROBLEMS or THE FAMILY 188 (1952);
PRiTcHARD, LAW OF WILLS AND EXECUTORS § 158 (2d ed., Sizer, 1928); 35 AM.
JuR., Marriage §§ 266-68 (1941).
4. See generally HARPER, PROBLEMS OF THE FAMILY 187-89 (1952); Parr-
cHARD, LAW OF WILLS AND ExECUTORS §§ 155-60 (2d ed., Sizer, 1928); 35 Am.
JUR., Marriage §§ 247-82 (1941); Note, 122 A.L.R. 7 (1939).
5. HARPER, PROBLEMS OF THE FAMILY 187 (1952). Such restraints upon
second marriages are usually upheld, however. Hinton v. Bowen, 186 Tenn.
463, 230 S.W.2d 965 (1950); Overton v. Lea, 108 Tenn. 505, 68 S.W. 250 (1902);
Note, 163 A.L.R. 1152, 1160 (1946).
6. See note 4 supra; 35 Am. Ju., Marriage § 256 (1941). And both partial
and general restraints may be upheld if they are drafted so as to constitute
limitations upon the duration of an estate rather than as conditions to the
vesting thereof. See Hinton v. Bowen, 186 Tenn. 463, 230 S.W.2d 965 (1950);
PmRTcHARD, LAW OF WILLS AND EXECUTORS § 159 (2d ed., Sizer, 1928); 35 AM.
JuR., Marriage §§ 258, 271, 272 (1941).
7. Thus if the condition is precedent and the gift is real estate, the gift is
void; if the gift is personalty, the condition is sometimes stricken and the gift
upheld. If the condition is subsequent, then regardless of whether the gift
is real or personal property, the gift is sustained and the condition is stricken.
PRITCHARD, LAW OF WILLS AND EXECUTORS § 158 (2d ed., Sizer, 1928).
8. RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY §§ 437-38 (1944).
9. In re Adoption of Myers, 265 S.W.2d 12 (Tenn. 1954).
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testimony rather than that of the welfare worker, and the Supreme
Court held that, inasmuch as the chancellor acted as both judge and
jury in the matter, his determination of the credibility of the witnesses
settled the issue of the preponderance of proof.
As presently drawn, the Tennessee adoption statutes 0 require the
harmonious cooperation of the courts and welfare or child-placing
agencies. Both must perform essential functions in the delicate task
of placing a child in a foster home. Some misunderstandings are almost
inevitable while the adoption statutes are still new, but it is to be
hoped that friction between the courts and the agencies will be mini-
mal. Inasmuch as the subject of adoption is still a legal one, involving
the judicial processes, however, the courts must of necessity use their
inherent powers to curb unwarranted interference whenever found.
CUSTODY OF CHILDREN
In the case of Weaver v. Weaver," the Court of Appeals dealt with a
prolonged custody dispute between divorced parents. After the
father was awarded a divorce in 1946, custody of the child was rotated
between the parents at intervals of three months each. In 1948, how-
ever, as the child approached school age, both parents sought its
dominant custody. A lengthy hearing was held, with the chancellor
awarding custody to the father. The Court of Appeals reversed and
gave custody to the mother. The controversy had been pending in
the courts for three years, principally because the father had re-
peatedly sought extensions of time before the appeal was heard in the
higher court. During this time the child had been with its mother.
Stating that the welfare of the child, not the parents, is the primary
concern of the courts in such matters,'2 the Court of Appeals felt that
a young child should be with its mother unless she is clearly shown
to be unfit.13 The great mass of partisan testimony in the record
failed to convince the Court of her unfitness.
The opinion is noteworthy in that the Court frankly pointed out
"the unsuitability of adversary litigation as a vehicle for determining
delicate family relationships."' 4 Increasingly, in this and other juris-
dictions, the need for special courts to deal with domestic relations
cases is being recognized.' 5 Such courts, with independent investi-
gatory powers and staffed with trained counsellors, would seem to be
10. Tenn. Pub. Acts 1951, c. 202; TENN. CODE AwN. §§ 9572.15 et seq. (Williams
Supp. 1953).
11. 261 S.W.2d 145 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1953).
12. See Powell v. Powell, 36 Tenn. App. 367, 255 S.W.2d 717 (M.S. 1952) dis-
cussed in the 1953 Survey, 6 VAN.D. L. REV. 981 (1953).
13. Newburger v. Newburger, 10 Tenn. App. 555 (W.S. 1930).
14. 261 S.W.2d at 147.
15. See HARPER, PROBLEMS OF THE FAmny 771-75 (1952), discussing the
recommendations made in this respect by the Federal Council of Churches of
Christ, the American Bar Association and other interested groups.
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far better equipped to determine such difficult problems as divorce,
support, custody and adoption than can be done by adversary litiga-
tion in the regular trial courts. The fact that the Court of Appeals in
the present case had a record of over three thousand pages of partisan
testimony dealing with the fitness of these parents for custody and
still had great difficulty in determining the true facts indicates some-
thing of the inadequacy of the present system. The frank acknowledg-
ment by the court of the need for an innovation in the handling of
domestic relations cases should act as a spur to creative and construc-
tive legislation in this field.
In Williams v. Williams,6 the mother of a child obtained a divorce
in 1941 and was awarded custody. She also received an alimony
award. She later remarried, but the father did not take any action
to have the alimony terminated. In 1952 he filed a petition to change
custody on the ground that the mother and her present husband were
mistreating the child. The father was in arrears in the alimony pay-
ments, however, apparently because of illness and inability to pay.
Since he was prima facie in contempt for failure to make the pay-
ments,17 the trial court dismissed his petition without a hearing on
the merits. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the welfare of
the child was at stake, and the father should have a hearing on the
merits despite his arrearage in alimony. The result seems entirely
sound, particularly so in view of the fact that the alimony might well
have been terminated by proper petition upon the remarriage of the
mother,18 and even at present the arrearage might be cancelled upon
proper showing of hardship and inability to pay.19
SUPPORT OF CHILDREN
In Chappell v. Chappell,"° a contempt proceeding, a mother had
obtained a divorce in 1943, and had been awarded custody of a child
upon substituted service of process, the father being a non-resident
at the time. The decree also awarded periodic paympnts for the
support of the complainant and her child. From time to time over
16. 263 S.W.2d 531 (Tenn. 1953).
17. Clark v. Clark, 152 Tenn. 431, 278 S.W. 65 (1925).
18. Generally alimony payments do not terminate automatically upon re-
marriage of the wife unless the decree of divorce or the divorce statutes
expressly so provide. COMPTON, CASES ON DOMESTIc RELATiONS 330-36 (1951);
ADDEN, DOMESTIC R,.ELATIONS 329 (1931) ; 17 Ar. JUR., Divorce and Separation
§ 610 (1938). Almost universally, however, the husband may have themterminated or modified by petition to the divorce court.
19. In a number of states accrued alimony installments become final judg-
ments, not subject to modification by the courts. COMPTON, CASES ON DOMESTIC
RELATIONS 332 (1951); Note, 6 A.L.R. 2d 1278 (1949). In Tennessee, however,
the courts may cancel or modify accrued installments since all matters of
support and alimony remain within the jurisdiction of the trial court under
TENx. CODE . §§ 8446, 8454 (Williams 1934). Gossett v. Gossett, 34 Tenn.
App. 654, 241 S.W.2d 934 (W.S. 1951).
20. 261 S.W.2d 824 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1952).
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the next eight or nine years, the father made the payments required
by this decree. He was twice arrested for contempt for non-payment
under the decree; each time he paid the arrearage. At no time did
he question the validity of the decree. In the present case he was again
cited for contempt, and this time he challenged the support decree
as having been rendered without personal service of process. Both the
trial court and the Court of Appeals recognized that the decree ini-
tially was void for lack of jurisdiction, but both held that the father
had acquiesced in the provisions of the decree and had voluntarily ac-
cepted them to such an extent that he was no longer in position to
attack the validity .thereof. Further, in the present proceedings, he had
entered a general appearance and had filed answer to the merits,
thereby curing the defect in the original decree.
2
1
The contempt decree was reversed, however, on the purely tech-
nical ground that it did not recite on its face that the father was able
to make the payments. While a number of Tennessee cases have held,
in accord with the general rule, that inability to pay is a defense to
contempt proceedings, 22 it is well established that this is an affirma-
tive defense, to be proved by the defendant.3 Accordingly it appears
highly technical and unnecessarily strict to reverse a finding of con-
tempt for mere lack of the recital that the defendant is able to pay.
LEGITIMACY OF CHILDREN
In Winfield v. Cargill,4 the Supreme Court held that the child of a
bigamous and entirely void marriage was legitimate. The father was
already married when he went through the ceremony with the mother
of the child. He was later killed, and the issue in this case was
whether the child of the second marriage, born posthumously, could
share in workmen's .compensation benefits. In holding that the child
was legitimate and entitled to a share, the Supreme Court followed
much the same reasoning as that of the Court of Appeals in a case
discussed in the 1953 Survey.25
DIvoRcE AND AmmoNY
The case of Schneider v. Schneider2 6 involved an attack upon a
1945 amendment27 to the Shelby County Divorce Proctor statute.
28
21. 3 AM. Jur., Appearances § 37 (1936).
22. Going v. Going, 148 Tenn. 522, 256 S.W. 390, 31 A.L.R. 633 (1923); Brad-
shaw v. Bradshaw, 23 Tenn. App. 359, 133 S.W.2d 617 (M.S. 1939); 17 AM. Jua.,
Divorce and Separation § 671 (1938).
23. State ex rel Wright v. Upchurch, 194 Tenn. 657, 254 S.W.2d 748 (1953);
Gossett v. Gossett, 34 Tenn. App. 654, 241 S.W. 2d 934 (W.S. 1951),
24. 264 S.W.2d 584 (Tenn. 1954).
25. Taliaferro v. Rogers, 35 Tenn. App. 521, 248 S.W. 2d 835 (W.S. 1951),
6 VAm. L. REV. 983 (1953), 22 TENN. L. REV. 1066 (1953).
26. 260 S.W.2d 290 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1952).
27. Tenn. Pub. Acts 1945, c. 109.
28. Tenn. Pub. Acts 1915, c. 121.
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The amendment authorized the proctor to appeal from the decree of
a trial court in any divorce case when he felt the general welfare
required this action. The original statute creating the office of divorce
proctor was upheld many years ago as not contravening the Tennessee
constitutional provisions against class legislation" The Court of
Appeals accordingly held that this amendment likewise did not violate
those provisions but affected the county in its governmental capacity
only.
In his appeal in this case the proctor challenged the power of a
trial court to grant an absolute divorce to a pregnant woman. His
contention was that this would cause the child to be born out of wed-
lock, and that therefore the only course open to the trial court was to
give a limited divorce, to be made absolute after the birth of the child.
While the point is one of first impression in Tennessee, the contention
of the proctor that the child, conceived in wedlock, could be rendered
illegitimate by the subsequent divorce of its parents, seems unsound.
At common law a child conceived or born during the lawful wedlock
of its parents was legitimate; 30 if this were not true, a posthumous
child could not be legitimate, since the marriage of its parents would
have been terminated before its birth. Further, the Tennessee legiti-
macy statute3 ' would appear without question to apply to this type
of case; the statute, which is always liberally construed to protect the
legitimacy of children,32 provides that the dissolution or annulment
of marriage shall not affect the legitimacy of children.
The Court of Appeals held that the contention of the proctor was
unsound, however, without discussion of the effect of the divorce upon
the status of the child. The statutory ground of divorce in this case
was cruelty. The Code expressly authorizes either an absolute or a
limited divorce upon this ground,3 3 and it makes no exception with
respect to pregnant women; accordingly the court held that it could
not carve out such an exception.
In Doty v. Doty34 a circuit court had held that a written property
settlement and support agreement, incorporated into a divorce decree,
could not be modified upon subsequent petitions alleging a change in
circumstances. The Court of Appeals reversed. Under the agreement,
in addition to settling property rights, the husband agreed to make
periodic payments for the support of his wife and child. The court of
appeals held that the support provisions of the settlement were so
merged into the divorce decree that they lost their contractual nature
29. Wilson v. Wilson, 134 Tenn. 697, 185 S.W. '718 (1916).
30. MADDEN, DOMESTIC RELATIONS 336 (1931).
31. TENN. CODE ANN. § 8453 (Williams 1934).
32. Taliaferro v. Rogers, 35 Tenn. App. 521, 248 S.W.2d 835 (W.S. 1951).
See note 25 supra.
33. TENN. CODE ANN. § 8427 (Williams 1934).
34. 260 S.W.2d 411 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1952).
[ VoL,. 7
DOMESTIC RELATIONS
and could be modified by later court action.35 It recognized that a
pure property settlement, unrelated to support and maintenance, may
not be subject to modification. 6 In the present case, however, there
were separable provisions dealing with support of the wife, and by
statute such matters remain within the jurisdiction of the courts3 7
Further, the court pointed out that support for a child was involved
as well as alimony to the wife; therefore the trial court did not lose
power to modify the settlement, nor could it deprive itself of that
power even if it should desire to do so.38
The distinction between venue and jurisdiction of the subject matter
was emphasized by the Supreme Court in Kelley v. Kelley.39 In that
case both parties to a divorce action lived in Hamblen County when
the bill was filed. The wife brought her action in Knox County, how-
ever, and apparently service was had on the husband in Ilamblen. 40
A divorce was granted to her in Knox County. The husband brought
the present action to set aside the divorce on the ground that neither
party had ever been a resident of Knox County. The Code permits
a divorce action, in the case of a resident defendant, to be filed in the
county "where the parties resided at the time of their separation, or
in which the defendant resides or is found.' ' 41 The court held that this
provision relates to venue only, not to jurisdiction of the subject
matter, and unless the issue of venue is raised by a preliminary plead-
ing, it is waived. 42 While the Knox County court might well, in its
discretion, have dismissed the action,43 it was not compelled to do so.
Since it had general jurisdiction over the subject matter of divorce,
the court's decree could not be collaterally attached for improper
venue.
MISCELLANEOUS
In Morrison v. State44 the Supreme Court dealt with the criminal
responsibility of a married woman. The defendant was convicted of
unlawful possession of intoxicating liquor.45 It was proved that the
arresting officers had found the liquor in her wardrobe, and that she
35. See Osborne v. Osborne, 29 Tenn. App. 463, 197 S.W.2d 234 (E.S. 1946).
36. Notes, 58 A.L.R. 639 (1929), 109 A.L.R. 1068 (1937), 166 A.L.R. 675 (1947).
37. TENN. CODE ANm. § 8446 (Williams 1934).
38. TENN. CODE ANN. § 8454 (Williams 1934) expressly retains child support
decrees before the trial court.
39. 263 S.W.2d 505 (Tenn. 1953).
40. If service was obtained in Knox County, there could be no question as
to that county's being the proper county for suit, inasmuch as the venue
statute, TENN. CODE ANN. § 8429 (Williams 1934), fixes the county in which
the defendant is found as proper venue. Williams v. Williams, 193 Tenn. 133,
244 S.W.2d 995 (1951).
41. TENwN. CODE ANN. § 8429 (Williams 1934).
42. Brown v. Brown, 155 Tenn. 530, 296 S.W. 356 (1926); McFerrin v. Mc-
Ferrin, 28 Tenn. App. 552, 191 S.W.2d 946 (W.S. 1945).
43. Walton v. Walton, 96 Tenn. 25, 33 S.W. 561 (1896).
44. 263 S.W.2d 504 (Tenn. 1953).
45. TENN. CODE ANN. § 11216 (Williams 1934).
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had stated that she had been expecting a raid. The defendant did not
at any time deny ownership of the liquor. On appeal, however, she
insisted that since the liquor was found in the home where she was
living with her husband, the presumption arose that the husband, not
the wife, owned it, he being the head of the household.
Prior to the enactment of the emancipation statutes, there was a
presumption in practically all cases that a crime committed by a mar-
ried woman in the presence of her husband was the result of coercion
by him.46 While coercion is still a defense, in many states there is no
longer a presumption that it existed.47
In the instant case, the Supreme Court held, in accord with a num-
ber of previous decisions,48 that a presumption of ownership by the
husband does still exist in Tennessee, but it is a rebuttable presump-
tion, disappearing in the face of positive testimony. The court held
that it had been rebutted in the instant case, or that at least the cir-
cumstances related'above made a jury issue as to ownership of the
liquor.
46. COMPTON, CASES ON DO1MESTic RELATIONS 422-26 (1951); MADDEN, Do-
M,1ESTIC RELATIONS § 68 (1931). The presumption did not apply to cases of
treason and usually was not applied in murder cases, nor in criminal matters
where women were more frequently the offenders than men, such as the
keeping of bawdyhouses.
47. Morton v. State, 141 Tenn. 357, 209 S.W. 644, 4 A.L.R. 264 (1919); Notes,
4 A.L.R. 266 (1919), 71 A.L.R. 1116 (1931).
48. Waller v. State, 178 Tenn. 509, 160 S.W.2d 404 (1941); Johnson v. State,
152 Tenn. 184, 274 S.W. 12 (1925); Crocker v. State, 148 Tenn. 106, 251 S.W.
914 (1922).
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